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Abstract
Canada is among the world’s foremost refugee resettlement 
countries and is signatory to international agreements that 
affi  rm its commitment to the protection of refugee rights. 
Asylum seekers come to Canada from around the globe. 
But as climate change continues to aff ect growing regions 
of the world—threatening to create as many as 200 mil-
lion environmental migrants by the year 2050—Canada 
has not yet begun to address the issue of climate change 
migration. In an era defi ned by a neo-liberal approach to 
migration issues, and until international actors determine 
the status of environmental migrants, Canada’s policy 
response to the looming crisis may be conjectured from 
an historical review of its refugee policy. Th is provides an 
understanding of the various factors, both domestic and 
international, that may have the greatest infl uence on 
Canada’s future refugee policy.
Résumé
Le Canada est aux premières loges dans le domaine de la 
réinstallation des réfugiés et est signataire de conventions 
internationales qui confi rment son engagement envers la 
protection des droits des réfugiés. Des demandeurs d’asile 
viennent au Canada de partout dans le monde. Mais alors 
que le changement climatique continue d’aff ecter les régions 
viticoles du monde, menaçant de créer non moins de 200 
millions de migrants climatiques d’ici l’an 2050, le Canada 
n’a pas encore commencé à aborder la question des migra-
tions dues aux changements climatiques. Dans une époque 
caractérisée par une approche néolibérale envers la ques-
tion de la migration, et jusqu’à ce que le statut des migrants 
climatiques soit déterminé par les acteurs internationaux, 
on peut deviner la réponse politique canadienne à la crise 
imminente à partir d’un examen historique de sa politique 
envers les réfugiés. Cette approche éclaire les diff érents fac-
teurs, tant internes qu’internationaux, qui peuvent avoir 
le plus d’infl uence sur l’avenir de la politique canadienne 
envers les réfugiés.
Nature may be viewed parochially from the perspective of the 
nation-state’s territory and the ability of the ecology to support 
the existing population. Nature may also be viewed globally from 
the perspective of world ecology and the right of all individuals, 
including future generations to have access to the essentials of 
life. In either case, the pre-eminent value in determining jus-
tice claims is the preservation of an ecological balance. Th e goal 
sought is survival.1
When Canadian philosopher Howard Adelman wrote the above in 1992 he was asking what rights and justice principles should be considered for 
those who “have fl ed in order to survive.”2 In 2011, migration 
forced by climate change represents an evolving humanitar-
ian crisis where survival is paramount, yet the nations of 
the world have so far failed to agree on establishing formal 
protections for environmental migrants. In countries where 
climate change has already triggered environmental migra-
tions the situation is escalating and urgent. For example, in 
Bangladesh the sea comes ever closer for the roughly 75 mil-
lion people who live less than twelve metres above sea level. 
Environmental migrants typically make their way to urban 
centres and Bangladesh is no exception. Its capital, Dhaka, 
is already full up. By the middle of this century as many as 
25 million Bangladeshis are at risk of displacement because 
of climate change. Migration within the country could 
stress the social, economic, and political structures to such 
a degree that regional security would be compromised.3
In 2009 Bangladesh’s fi nance minister asked the world’s 
industrialized countries to take millions of climate 
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refugees. His plea was supported by the chairman of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC ), who 
said that the developed world will need to take “legisla-
tive action” in order to process and settle up to 40 million 
people.4
When veteran Canadian Liberal MP Maria Mina visited 
Bangladesh in 2010 she was asked whether Canada would 
accept “Bangladeshi climate refugees.” Mina told repor-
ters, “It’s not impossible. And of course Canada would look 
out a new policy that would address the crisis of climate 
change and obviously Bangladesh will be included there.”5 
While Minna’s public remarks are not Liberal Party policy, 
they are indicative of increasing international pressure to 
respond to environmental migrants.
By the year 2050 the world could have as many as 200 
million environmental migrants whose forced displace-
ment from their homelands would be defi nitively linked 
to climate change.6 If these projections are to be believed, 
Canada will become a manifestly desirable destination for a 
large diversity of people from around the globe.7 Although 
most climate migration will be within state borders or 
shared among neighbouring states, those with fi nancial and 
social capacity will follow established migration routes to 
traditional refugee receiving countries or forge new ones.8
Despite the “outward manifestation of profound depriva-
tion and despair”9 that populations displaced as a result of 
persistent ecological change represent, the international 
community has failed to deliver any adequate response 
to their needs. In the meantime, industrialized and emer-
ging states continue to build regional networks of secur-
ity between themselves and the asylum seekers who make 
increasingly risky journeys between their countries of ori-
gin and their destinations. For example, India is building an 
eight-foot high, 2,500-mile long, barbed wire fence between 
itself and Bangladesh.10
Th ere is a profound lack of capacity in the developing 
world to deal with the social, economic, and political prob-
lems associated with climate change and forced migrations. 
Developing states are demanding more funding for climate 
adaptation and mitigation strategies as well as aid for host-
ing regional migrant populations.
While the international community negotiates these 
issues, including the continuing debate on the status of 
environmental migrants, Canada’s political parties have 
neither begun their own deliberations nor attempted to 
engage Canadians in any discussion. At its annual confer-
ence in August 2008 the Institute of Public Administration 
of Canada (IPAC) made the following spare recommenda-
tion: “Th e Canadian government should collaborate [with 
regional and international actors] on developing a policy 
to deal with anticipated ‘climate change refugees.’”11 Th is 
paper moves beyond IPAC’s recommendation and asks: 
Given the absence of any formal law, regulation, govern-
ment statement, or policy that directly articulates a position 
on environmental migrants, do any international or domes-
tic factors have the potential to produce either a formal or 
ad hoc change in Canadian refugee policy that recognizes 
any special status for people whose migration and perma-
nent displacement is directly linked to climate change?
Method
My study endeavours to evaluate factors that may infl uence 
Canada’s future response to an emerging issue. At the same 
time, it is directly informed by Canada’s past response to 
refugees, changes in national political and public discourse, 
and/or concrete changes in refugee policy. Th erefore I 
conceptualize and hypothesize based on learning from 
Canada’s actions in response to past events. My observa-
tions emerge from both scholarly and grey documents as 
well as media reports. I explore fi ve factors that could lead 
to the inclusion of environmental migrants in the political 
and public discussion of refugee policy and produce specifi c 
policy on environmental migrants: (1) an international 
agreement on the status of environmental migrants; (2) 
international moral pressure led by the United Nations 
High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR); (3) the infl u-
ence of Australia’s historical record of immigration and 
refugee acceptance on Canadian policy; (4) strong domes-
tic pressure; and (5) a rejection of the emerging confl ation 
between humanitarianism and national security.
I begin this study with an assessment of the evolving 
debate on the status of environmental refugees. An histor-
ical account of Canadian refugee policy and its relationship 
to Australian refugee policy and infl uence on both coun-
tries from the UNHCR follows. I then look at the current 
discourse that informs humanitarian practices and frames 
the current era. Finally I assess the level of awareness in 
Canada of environmental refugees and compare this to the 
awareness abroad—particularly in Australia, the UN and 
international agencies, and the EU. Specifi cally, this paper 
provides a context with which to assess the infl uence of the 
UNHCR on the evolution of Canadian refugee policy. A dis-
cussion of Australia is included since it provides a valuable 
context with which to forecast the progression of Canada’s 
future policy.
Th e policy of a national government can be infl uenced 
by domestic factors, but also by its relationship with other 
states and international organizations. For example, in 
her study of how national interests are learned from inter-
national actors, Martha Finnemore notes, “[T]he defi nition 
of the ‘problem’ and the strategies for solving it came from 
international organizations and the individuals who created 
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and ran them.”12 Th is parallels the work of other scholars 
in the area of policy convergence and diff usion who note 
that international imposition, as well as emulation, are 
oft en important drivers of domestic policy actions.13 Th is 
paper refl ects on the experiences and infl uence on Canada 
of the UNHCR, the world’s principal international refugee 
organization.
Th e infl uence of international norms on domestic policy, 
however, is not unidirectional, and international organiza-
tions are also vulnerable to domestic pressures for change as 
promoted by their members. In recent decades, the UNHCR 
has adjusted its emphasis from protection to repatriation. 
Member states have used earmarked funding14 to steer the 
UNHCR’s mandate.
Canada’s refugee response has also been informed by, and 
has informed, Australia’s refugee regime. Rebecca Hamlin 
fi nds that “[both] nations tend to oscillate between moments 
of crisis and calm in extremely reactive fashion, never able 
to anticipate potential pitfalls until they are occurring.”15 
Th ese two states are similar in their post-colonial relation-
ships, their patterns of settlement, and the evolution of 
immigration policies that initially excluded non-Europeans 
but went on to foster multicultural policies.
Constructivists theorize that states are embedded in trans-
national and international social relations that shape their 
role in the world. Th ey are socialized to want certain things, 
and power and wealth are means, not ends. Internationally 
held or communicated norms also infl uence citizens, who, 
in turn, infl uence states.16 Likewise, policy diff usion occurs 
when national policy makers voluntarily adopt policy mod-
els that are communicated internationally.17 For example, 
the diff usion of international norms promoted by the 
UNHCR in Canada and Australia was an important reason 
for both countries dropping immigration and refugee poli-
cies that discriminated on the basis of race. If Australia and 
Canada were to take their place among the leading developed 
nations and become participants in the international regime 
of refugee protection, they needed to be seen to subscribe to 
the new ideologies that were grounded in human rights and 
celebrated the spirit of decolonization.
Both countries have since contracted to a number of 
similar international and supranational agreements. But 
domestic events also infl uence policy makers. In my study 
I will show how comparable refugee events in a domestic 
setting of both Australia and Canada tend to have similar 
policy outcomes. In recent years, domestic state interests 
have also infl uenced the UNHCR which in turn has set new 
international norms. Hence, the infl uence of international 
norms on domestic policy is not unidirectional, and inter-
national organizations are also vulnerable to domestic pres-
sures for change as promoted by their members.
Climate Change and Its Relationship to Migration
Any Canadian refugee policy that recognizes environ-
mental migrants will have acknowledged the direct link 
between climate change and migration. International obli-
gations would form around the responsibility of the indus-
trialized world—which has benefi ted from carbon emis-
sions—to the developing world, which is least able to adapt 
to new climate environments. Much of the prevailing pol-
itical reluctance is justifi ed using the work of scholars such 
as Richard Black who say that no pristine cause of migra-
tion can be identifi ed.
Even if the world manages to slow climate change to argu-
ably manageable levels18 by reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions or through geoengineering,19 there will continue 
to be those who are displaced or who have their daily access 
to sustenance threatened by climate change. Emissions that 
exist in the atmosphere today can persist for decades and 
will continue to aff ect the global climate. According to the 
UNHCR, “Nine out of every ten natural disasters today are 
climate-related [and] … as many as 20 million people may 
have been displaced by climate-induced sudden-onset nat-
ural disasters in 2008 alone.”20
In May 2009, a United Nations University report made 
several fundamental observations that are supported by a 
variety of studies worldwide: It found that migration due 
to climate change is already under way, and that climate 
change can cause the “collapse of social safety nets,” which 
in turn fuels confl ict and violence. It also observed that 
people who migrate because of “gradually deteriorating liv-
ing conditions” are regarded as economic migrants, and as 
such have no recourse to any of the international instru-
ments that diff erentially protect the rights of internally dis-
placed people, asylum seekers, and refugees.21 In addition, 
migrant populations place enormous strain on the environ-
ments in which they settle. Th is in turn can accelerate deg-
radation already precipitated by climate change.
Although all the nations of the globe will experience 
climate change eff ects, states most aff ected by rising sea 
levels will be Bangladesh, Egypt, China, India, and, to a 
lesser degree, Indonesia, Th ailand, Pakistan, Mozambique, 
Gambia, Senegal, and Suriname. Certain island states in 
the Pacifi c and Indian oceans face the prospect of elimina-
tion. Storms will force permanent displacement within the 
Caribbean. Drought will aff ect northern Mexico and parts 
of South America including some of its cities. Water scarcity 
and drought will also affl  ict parts of Africa, tropical Asia, 
southern Europe, Australia, the U, and southern Canada 
Although most climate migration will be contained within 
state borders or among neighbouring states, forecasts antici-
pate environmental migrant fl ows from sub-Saharan Africa 
to Europe and the Middle East.22 Migrations to the United 
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States are expected to come from Mexico, Central America, 
and the Caribbean.23
While terms such as “climate refugee” and “environ-
mental refugee” appear throughout this paper, Koko Warner 
et al. off er the following defi nition, which is also used by 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Th ere 
are no international norms or obligations attached to this 
defi nition.
Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, 
for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the 
environment that adversely aff ect their lives or living conditions, 
are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either 
temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their 
country or abroad.24
Scholars have been struggling to fi nd a defi nitive term 
to express the plight of people who are forced to migrate 
from their home territories due to environmental degrada-
tion since the mid-1980s.25 Most climate scholars claim that 
there is indisputable evidence of a direct link between cli-
mate change and human migration.26 Richard Black, how-
ever, argues that despite the large number of climate refugee 
typologies used it is not possible to separate climate causes 
of migration from causes such as poverty, overpopulation, 
political instability, land disputes, or a multitude of other 
factors that have historically caused people to migrate. He 
argues that scholars who recognize climate refugees do so 
based on lack of concrete evidence to support their method-
ology. According to Black, “despite the breadth of examples 
provided in the literature, the strength of the academic case 
put forward is oft en depressingly weak.”27 Black’s fi ndings, 
however, de-emphasize the climate change science that 
shows direct links between global warming, rising sea lev-
els, desertifi cation, and environmental confl ict that cause 
human migration. Black places the term “environmental 
refugees” in quotation marks, implying a lack of veracity.
Current protections for refugees exist under the restrict-
ive terms of the 1951 United Nations Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees. (Th e 1967 Protocol expanded the 
Convention to include refugee events that occurred out-
side of Europe and aft er 1951.) Th ose who meet the terms 
of the defi nition trigger an international agreement on the 
part of signatory states to guarantee their protection. It also 
obliges those states not to return Convention refugees to 
their country of origin—the principle of non-refoulement. A 
Convention refugee is:
[A]ny person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particu-
lar social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
origin and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country; or … owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to return to it.28
While some scholars29 argue that the Convention could 
be interpreted to include environmental refugees as a 
“social group,” or that “government-induced environmental 
degradation” is a form of persecution,30 there appears to 
be growing scholarly agreement that an expansion of the 
Convention defi nition not only might overwhelm the man-
date of the UNHCR but also would undermine the protec-
tions currently off ered to Convention refugees.31 Th e United 
Nations 2009 annual report advises that the UNHCR and 
the IOM would not expand the Convention and that the 
term “refugee” should be avoided in relation to environ-
mental migrants.32
In his examination of fi ndings from both Black’s and 
Myers’s studies, Castles33 agrees that environmental refu-
gees are created by a multitude of causalities where environ-
mental factors such as rising water levels and fl oods, per-
sistent and severe drought, growing numbers of extreme 
weather events, desertifi cation, and so on may be linked 
to social, political, and economic factors such as poverty, 
ineff ectual governance, development projects, poor agricul-
tural techniques, civil war, and struggle over the control of 
land resources.34 As a result, the challenge of identifying a 
pristine “well founded fear of persecution” as required by 
the Convention becomes very diffi  cult, and mixed migra-
tions forced by the consequences of climate change oft en 
continue to be counted largely as economic migrations.
Th e political reluctance to resolve the defi nition debate is 
characterized by the absence of discourse on environmental 
refugees at the highest levels of the United Nations. A study 
by Karen McNamara35 suggests that the work of scholars 
such as Black, whose critiques emphasize multi-causalities 
and challenge the term “environmental refugees,” have 
allowed political actors and others to exclude the environ-
mental from refugee research and policy. Her examination 
of the discourse of policy making used by UN ambassa-
dors and senior diplomats revealed a growing trend toward 
unilateralism among the most powerful nations whose 
focus is currently on issues of national security. Increasing 
xenophobia among the public in their home states tends to 
support this thinking.36 As long as the ambiguity of multi-
causalities holds credence, Canada may choose to prioritize 
security rather than develop any rights-based policy on 
environmental migrants.
Any resolution of this debate is likely to be steered by 
the UNHCR, which has established itself as both an expert 
and moral authority on refugee fl ows by systematically 
extending its jurisdiction. Over time, and despite a general 
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lag in support for the reinterpretation and expansion of the 
UNHCR’s mandate by its member states, the UNHCR has 
achieved many of its ambitious objectives.37 Th is has been 
accomplished through a process of diff usion by which mem-
ber states eventually came to agree with, and to support, the 
objectives of the UNHCR—ultimately incorporating them 
into their own domestic policies. Th us the humanitarian 
motivations, objectives, and actions of the UNHCR even-
tually became normalized in both the national and inter-
national discourse. Once any one of these is accepted and 
articulated by one state, other states may follow, led by the 
pressure of discourse in their own states or from other state 
actors in the international arena.
In 2010 it seems probable that environmental migrants 
may eventually be protected through an extension of the UN 
regulations governing Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). 
Th is provides protections but is not legally binding on any 
party. It is categorized as soft -law. Indeed, soft -law is con-
sidered by many to be inadequate to the task of protecting 
as many as 23 million IDPs, and as such is considered an 
inappropriate model for climate refugees.38
Th e UNHCR and Its Infl uence on Canadian 
and Australian Refugee Policies: 
Historic and Comparative Perspective
Th e UNHCR was created to provide legal determinants 
for the passage of refugees with an emphasis on protection 
and resettlement. By the 1980s it had begun to emphasize 
repatriation and now prioritizes repatriation and human 
security. Some charge that this emphasis comes at the 
expense of refugee protection and the right to asylum.39 
Canada and Australia have had a fl uctuating relationship 
with the UNHCR and its predecessors. Key events dem-
onstrate meaningful periods of convergence or divergence 
of policy among Canada, Australia, and the UNHCR and 
provide context for the evolution of Canadian refugee 
determination. What then has been the history of change 
to Canadian refugee policy and does it off er any guidance 
on factors that might drive change that would recognize 
environmental refugees?
Th e UNHCR is the most infl uential international agency 
on refugee matters. While the world waits for its guidance 
on the status of environmental migrants, it is useful to look 
at the ways in which Canada and Australia have accepted, 
or rejected, its guidance in the past. Established in 1950, the 
UNHCR was never intended to be an operational agency 
concerned with material matters such as supplies of food 
and shelter.40 Its fi rst job was to establish a legal framework 
for the protection of refugees, which it accomplished with 
the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees. Th e 
strict terms of the Convention referred only to European 
refugees whose displacement could be traced to events 
occurring before 1951. Western European nations recog-
nized the value of an ostensibly non-partisan agency that 
could represent their interests and expedite the settlement 
of masses of displaced persons.41 As the industrialized 
nations aligned in opposition to the Communist East, the 
UNHCR’s resettlement of refugees from East to West lent 
legitimacy to the ideologies of the liberal democracies.42
In spite of resistance from developed states which were 
not inclined to support action on behalf of non-Europeans, 
the UNHCR began a process by which it would become the 
expert authority on refugees from anywhere in the world. 
“Ambitious high commissioners seized on various crises and 
global developments to campaign for a broader mandate.”43 
In time, the UNHCR became the moral authority on refu-
gees and refugee rights.
Th e successes of the UNHCR provided a model of engage-
ment with refugees from which Canada and Australia drew 
norms and policy. Th eir involvement with the UNHCR 
developed in stages. Initially reluctant, they eventually took 
pride in adopting the UNHCR’s humanitarian principles 
with regard to refugees. Canada’s and Australia’s participa-
tion in the international structure lent legitimacy to their 
newly emerged modern industrial democracies.
Canada’s evident ability to shift  policy positions sug-
gests that future policy that might address environmental 
migrants is possible.
Canada signed both the Convention and the Protocol in 
1969, during a period of prosperity and economic growth. 
Like Australia, its traditional sources of immigration had 
dwindled, and an immediate need for labour prompted it to 
explore new immigrant resources. Prior to 1967, Canada’s 
immigration policy formally discriminated against non-
white migrants.44 Australia acceded to the Convention in 
1954, but it did not sign the 1967 Protocol until 1973. Up 
until then it had maintained a “White Australia Policy,” 
established in 1901, which restricted non-white immigra-
tion. Hamlin suggests that had the countries been able to 
envisage today’s refugee challenges, they might not have 
signed at all. Th e Convention committed both states to 
the non-refoulement of Convention refugees. “In most cir-
cumstances, this commitment means that refugees acquire 
indirectly a right to remain in the state where they have 
claimed refugee status.”45
Refugee fl ows in the decades before the Second World 
War demonstrate that the successive small groups of bureau-
crats who were responsible for Canada’s ad hoc immigra-
tion and refugee policy held to their principal task—keeping 
racialized non-Europeans out. Th ey established legislation 
that demanded all asylum seekers to Canada should come 
in a continuous journey from source to destination. Th e 
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continuous journey requirement was designed “to deter 
immigrants from Asia and other alien parts of the world”46 
and foreshadowed the Safe Th ird Country agreement that 
would come into force some nine decades later. It was used 
eff ectively against all newcomers, refugees as well as would-
be immigrants.
In 1938 Canada participated in the Evian Conference 
on Refugees,47 convened by the US to discuss the growing 
plight of Jewish refugees fl eeing the widening Nazi regime. 
Canada argued against the creation of any international 
body that would be responsible for refugees and was ada-
mantly opposed to the imposition of refugee quotas for 
receiving countries. Australia’s position was much like 
Canada’s. Its representative told the conference, “we have 
no racial problem [and] we are not desirous of importing 
one by encouraging any scheme of large-scale foreign 
migration.”48
In 1947 Canada fi nally accepted displaced persons (DPs) 
who did not have relatives in Canada. Returning war vet-
erans brought back to Canada a new respect for the ethnic 
soldiers who had fought alongside them, as well as revul-
sion at the atrocities that had occurred in Europe based 
on notions of racial superiority. Th is, combined with new 
pressure from domestic ethnic communities who had made 
their own contribution to the war, meant that the Canadian 
public was now more tolerant of a multi-ethnic society.49 
Despite this, refugees remained subject to criteria that were 
in Canada’s self-interest. Th e Canadian Department of 
Labour’s involvement in the selection process highlighted 
the priority of a refugee claimant’s economic potential and 
social suitability. Communists and Jews were still rou-
tinely rejected. “An external aff airs representative said that 
Canada ‘selected refugees ‘like good beef cattle’.”50
In 1948 both Canada and Australia began to change their 
refugee regimes. British immigration to both countries had 
dwindled and it suited them to relax their restrictive poli-
cies and adopt a more generous stance framed by the new 
post-war environment. In part, this was a response to inter-
national pressure exercised by Britain, the United Nations, 
and the United States. But, as well, an unanticipated post-
war boom meant a great need for more people, and the fi rst 
decade aft er the war saw massive immigration to Canada 
of 1.25 million people, many from new source countries. 
Th at number included 100,000 displaced persons: “A new, 
more generous, more humanitarian policy towards refugees 
had captured Ottawa.”51 Australia competed with Canada 
and other New World countries for a hierarchy of desir-
able, white, European DPs. By 1953 it had resettled 180,000 
refugees.52
In 2011, an increasing number and diversity of immi-
grants from new source countries live in Canada. Over time, 
they may begin to infl uence government policy on environ-
mental migrants since many come from countries already 
aff ected by climate change, such as Bangladesh.
Th e UNHCR shaped an era for refugees in which modern, 
industrialized democracies needed and desired to be con-
strued as humanitarian. In response to a series of refugee 
producing events that were outside of the original strictures 
of the Convention, the UNHCR expanded its reach and 
its mandate. It established itself as an operational agency 
by providing material assistance to 200,000 Hungarian 
refugees who were readily accepted by both Australia 
and Canada. Both countries quickly appreciated that the 
Hungarians, who were white, healthy, and educated, would 
contribute to their economies.
Now the UNHCR began to receive requests for help 
from outside Europe. It developed a Good Offi  ces formula 
that provided “legal and political justifi cation” for initiat-
ing assistance and raising funds for refugee fl ows outside 
of its mandate.53 By 1965 the UNHCR had abandoned 
the distinction between Good Offi  ces and Statutory refu-
gees and endeavoured to protect all refugees. If Australia 
and Canada were to take their place among the leading 
developed nations and become participants in the inter-
national regime of refugee protection, they needed to be 
seen to subscribe to the new ideologies that were grounded 
in human rights.
Canada dropped its explicitly racist immigration policy in 
1969, under the “Just Society” government of Liberal prime 
minister Pierre Trudeau. Despite the absence of a formal 
domestic refugee policy Canada was one of the fi rst coun-
tries to respond to requests from Britain to accept Ugandan 
Asians and took 6,000 people. According to Irving Abella, 
these were the “cream of the crop” who most closely met 
immigration criteria.54 Australia was less forthcoming, and 
even though its White Australia policy was drawing to a 
close, it only issued about 200 visas. It did, however, make an 
additional contribution to the UNHCR to help resettle the 
Asians.55 But Canada had now established a precedent that 
would allow it to respond to international calls for help in the 
case of specifi cally identifi ed environmental migrants.
Canada was now providing lessons for Australia’s policy 
makers to draw on. By 1973, Australia’s White Australia 
policy was considered a “dangerous anachronism,” and 
following much public and political pressure the govern-
ment made discrimination based on race illegal.56 Australia 
signed the 1967 Protocol, the UNHCR document that 
removed formal Convention limitations to non-Europeans, 
and following Canada’s lead, began to move toward a multi-
cultural policy.57 Th e signing of the 1967 Protocol seems to 
have come at a pivotal moment for both countries and sig-
naled change to the world. Under the Trudeau government, 
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Canada signed the Protocol in 1969 and Multiculturalism 
was implemented as policy in 1971.58
Canada affi  rmed its commitment to refugees in the 
1976 Immigration Act, recognizing their need for dis-
tinct, humanitarian consideration, and moving beyond 
the Convention defi nition to include “displaced and perse-
cuted” people who could be processed as part of a “desig-
nated class.” Five years later Australia expanded its view 
of eligible refugees in its Global Special Humanitarian 
Program, which allowed it to accept “people who hold a 
fear of gross discrimination amounting to substantial vio-
lation of their human rights but not persecution.”59 Th ese 
two policy changes meant that both Canada and Australia 
could act outside the constraints of the Convention to bring 
in additional people whose fundamental human rights were 
compromised. Although not intended to address rights 
such as adequate food and clean water, now, both states had 
established the sort of policy that, in 2011, would potentially 
allow them to accept environmental migrants.
From Boat People to Boat Invasions
Th e sympathy of the developed nations for refugees fl eeing 
communism was highlighted in the response to the needs of 
the Vietnamese boat people beginning in 1978. Public senti-
ment in both Australia and Canada encouraged their gov-
ernments to generous action. In Canada, refugees arrived 
through the mechanisms of private sponsorship established 
by the 1976 Act. Eventually, including the additional num-
bers who arrived through family reunifi cation programs, 
each country accepted about 137,000 people.60
While the Vietnamese remain perhaps the foremost 
contemporary success story of the absorption of non-Euro-
pean refugees into Canadian and Australian societies, they 
marked the end of an era for the UNHCR.61 Th e refusal of 
neighbouring Southeast Asian states to give the Vietnamese 
refuge was exemplary of a growing discomfort in the 
developing world. Developing nations that struggled with 
the political implications of absorbing their neighbours’ dis-
placed populations, as well as the environmental and social 
pressures of refugee movements, made increasing con-
ditional demands on the UNHCR, NGOs, and developed 
states to support them in their eff orts to provide refuge.62
Two concepts left  behind from the Indochinese experience—
international burden-sharing and temporary asylum—‘proved 
a mixed legacy, both capable of being applied either to great 
humanitarian advantage or as an easy excuse to shift  the respon-
sibility and avoid the blame’.63
Developed states no longer saw resettlement as a durable 
solution. Donations to the UNHCR, on which it depended, 
were not keeping pace with its spiralling costs. In the 
1980s the UNHCR began to de-emphasize protection and 
to address the root causes of fl ight and the potential for 
repatriation.64 Over the next few years budgetary problems 
led to cuts to the UNHCR’s staff  by 15 per cent and its pro-
grams by 25 per cent. According to Barnett and Finnemore, 
“[W]hile in the 1970s UNHCR seemed able to confront and 
work with governments simultaneously, during the 1980s 
its relationship became more adversarial and it worried that 
it was angering the very states on whom it was dependent to 
sustain its activities.”65 Th e doors were closing.
By the mid-1980s, the number of asylum seekers seeking 
refuge in the West had skyrocketed.66 Th e increased fi nan-
cial cost of refugee fl ows overseas was refl ected in increased 
requests from the UNHCR to donor nations for more help. 
As well, the already high cost of processing domestic asylum 
applications was climbing: “Jet age refugees were no longer 
confi ned to their region of origin and now travelled dir-
ectly to Western countries by air transport … Th e asylum 
crisis put Western governments into direct confl ict with the 
UNHCR.”67
A degree of Canada’s international reputation relates to 
the infl uence of the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It 
established a measure of justice that was extended to refu-
gees in the Singh decision and won Canada international 
commendations. (Its provisions would give environmental 
migrants the right to a refugee hearing in Canada. But with-
out any defi ned status, they would likely be removed.) Th e 
Singh decision increased Canada’s reputation as an asylum 
destination and Canadians quickly became concerned that 
too many potential asylum seekers viewed entry to Canada 
as easy. Th ose concerns eventually coalesced in a vigorous 
antipathy toward new boat arrivals. Fears about “opening 
the fl oodgates” dominated the discourse. Boat arrivals from 
Sri Lanka and India in the 1980s led to “tumultuous and 
acrimonious political and public debates.”68
Policy and legislation were designed to deal with asylum 
seekers who it was feared were drawn by the perceived wel-
come that Canada had conveyed to all asylum seekers with 
its perceived amnesty in 1986.69 Bill C-55, which established 
the Immigration Review Board in 1988, also made provi-
sions for Safe Th ird Country70 legislation whereby asylum 
seekers would be returned to the country through which 
they had travelled on their journey to asylum, so long as that 
country was signatory to international laws of protection. It 
would not, however, be implemented until 2004. Th is legis-
lation would allow Canada to eff ectively avoid internal or 
external pressure to extend protections to environmental 
migrants since they would be unable to claim asylum in 
Canada.
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Canada began to impose visa restrictions on source 
countries. Refugee claimants travelling from the US were 
barred from entry pending a hearing date. By 1989, under 
the Conservative government of Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney, Bill C-84 allowed for the detention of asylum 
seekers until they had been proved credible by the author-
ities. Asylum seekers were now subject to immediate depor-
tation (with judicial approval) and to increased search and 
seizure provisions. In 1992, subsequent legislation, Bill 
C-86, provided carrier sanctions, limits on rejected asylum 
seekers’ right to appeal, fi ngerprinting, and rigorous entry 
interviews.71 In the same period, Australia responded to 
boatloads of Cambodians with legislation that, in 1992, led 
to mandatory detention and deportations for arrivals with-
out visas.72
Signifi cant penalties were provided for people smugglers 
who had become an identifi ed enemy delivering an illegal 
means of entry for those who would take advantage of gen-
erous legal protections and exploit domestic social welfare 
benefi ts. Janet Dench and Francois Crépeau argue that past 
refugees who used smugglers to escape oppressive and vio-
lent regimes such as Nazi Germany would be eff ectively 
kept out in today’s environment.73
In 2001, Australia established draconian legislation that 
came to be known as the Pacifi c Solution, which virtually 
stopped asylum seekers from reaching its shores. Among 
its exclusionary tactics was the excision of outlying terri-
tories from its migration zone, thus eliding the obligations 
attached to hearing refugee claims on Australian soil.74 Th e 
UNHCR played a supporting role in the Pacifi c Solution. 
With the IOM, it processed asylum seekers to Australia 
in third countries such as Nauru and Papua New Guinea. 
“States increasingly view refugee rights and non-refoulement 
as inconvenient obstacles when they have decided that it is 
time for refugees to go home.”75 Scott Watson argues that 
Australia’s refugee humanitarianism is now characterized 
by “refugee resettlement and non-violation of international 
obligations.”76 Developed states may take their lessons from 
Australia: Th e number of asylum seekers who reached its 
borders dropped by 75 per cent between 2000 and 2005.77 
Canada fi nally implemented its contentious Safe Th ird 
Country legislation in 2004.
Th e National/Human Security Discourse
An analysis of the current discourse around asylum seek-
ers that occurs both in Canada and internationally does not 
suggest that any Canadian refugee policy that would pro-
tect environmental migrants is at all foreseeable. Th e debate 
over environmental migrants has become more urgent in 
the current era of security and containment. Th e emer-
ging discourse of states that portrays refugee migrations 
as political matters of national security is evolving at the 
same time as the UNHCR’s attempt to maintain state sup-
port for refugee protections with the discursive reframing 
of protection as “human security.” “‘Uprooted populations,’ 
‘displaced people,’ and ‘involuntary migrants’ are new terms 
which tend to replace the concept of refugee; this slippage in 
the terminology is indicative of UNHCR’s response to the 
new demands of its member states.”78
In the meantime, developed states, including Canada, 
co-operate in regional and intraregional migration con-
trols such as interdiction and detention. Th e security 
dimension of these practices allows government agents to 
justify a degree of secrecy and a growing list of Regional 
Consultative Processes (RCPs) take place behind closed 
doors.79 In the 2000s, the developed nations of the world 
have containment as an early objective and the infrastruc-
ture to accomplish this is becoming more sophisticated. In 
the meantime, states that are signatory to the Convention 
continue to affi  rm the right of refugees to non-refoulement. 
Current measures are not articulated as exclusionary.
Until such time as international agencies such as the 
UN—and/or a collective of developing states—publicly and 
forcibly challenge this dominant and emerging regime, the 
UNHCR and the IOM will endeavour to keep refugee fl ows 
within the confi nes of their state. If asylum seekers cross bor-
ders they will be contained in neighbouring states. Funding 
for their stay will be processed through the UNHCR and 
the IOM. If they try to leave by plane they will need visas 
that prove nearly impossible to obtain. If they leave by boat 
they will face consequences that may include interdiction 
by state authorities. For example, a rarely documented case 
in 1999 revealed the complicity of an IOM offi  cial with the 
Canadian government in the forced “voluntary” repatriation 
of a boatload of Sri Lankan Tamils.80 (Asylum seekers may 
die at sea since smugglers and traffi  ckers have responded 
to the universal crackdown by putting their clients in boats 
that are unseaworthy—so reducing the smuggler’s material 
and fi nancial risk. Indeed, some asylum seekers are sent to 
sea in infl atable boats that they are responsible for sailing 
themselves.)81
Th e asylum seekers who do reach destinations in the 
developed states face the increased possibility of detention, 
sometimes in isolated, off shore locations. Th e UNHCR does 
not publish a list of all of the detention centres in all of the 
states.82 Asylum seekers might fi nd their applications “fast-
tracked” (oft en leading to repatriation). If they do stay they 
may receive very little social support, or their protection 
will hinge on a temporary visa that can mean their status 
in country remains precarious, paving the way for a host of 
social problems.
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Asylum applications to the developed countries rose 
from 200,000 in the early 1980s, to a record high of 850,000 
in 1992, then dropped. Numbers peaked again in 2001 
at 600,000.83 Over those years, 68 per cent of the asylum 
applications were made in the countries of the European 
Union. Overall, between 1987 and 2006, Australia has 
experienced a 61.7 per cent decline in asylum applications, 
and Canada was down 8.6 per cent. In the EU countries the 
trends are extremely diverse. For example, applications to 
the Netherlands decreased by more than 60 per cent while 
France experienced an increase of more than 50 per cent. 
Despite this inequity, the EU moves steadily toward har-
monization of refugee policy.
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) reports that, 
under a Liberal government, its international network of 
Migration Integrity Offi  cers stationed in the countries most 
likely to generate asylum seekers successfully interdicted at 
least 40,000 people en route to Canada between 1996 and 
late 2002.84 According to Brouwer and Kumin, Migration 
Integrity Offi  cers “do not appear to have any mandate to 
examine the intercepted person’s motivation for migration 
or to address any need for international protection.”85 In 
eff ect, they may be guilty of refoulement according to the 
Convention. Catherine Dauvergne argues that the various 
ways in which jurisdictions circumvent refugee law shows 
that they are engaged in a “race to the bottom to harmonize 
refugee law.”86
Humanitarianism and Security
Sovereignty is premised upon the legitimate authority to 
control borders in order to protect the interests of those who 
have legal status within them. According to Watson, states 
have fostered humanitarianism in their citizens and this has 
paved the way for formal refugee resettlement in states such 
as Canada.87 But scholars argue that once humanitarian-
ism has been internalized and normalized as part of a state’s 
identity, it can also become securitized. Th is leads to justifi -
cations of exclusion on the basis of humanitarianism.88
Canada, Australia, and the EU have all used humanitar-
ianism as a justifi cation for keeping asylum seekers away 
from their borders. Th is is based on the pre-eminent and 
humanitarian necessity of protecting the social stability and 
safety of their citizens, while also stopping the activities of 
“people traffi  ckers” who endanger the lives of the migrants 
who use them. B. S. Chimni argues, “Humanitarianism is 
the ideology of hegemonic states in the era of globalization 
marked by the end of the Cold War and a growing North-
South divide.”89
Dauvergne contends that countries that claim to accept a 
“just” number of asylum seekers, or assert that their accept-
ance decisions are based on humanitarian principles, do so 
in a moral vacuum. Th ere is no agreement among states as 
to what number is “just,” or of how humanitarianism may 
be judged. Th ese terms exist free of international norms, 
regulations, or laws. Decisions by developed states, there-
fore, take place in an “amoral realm.”90 Today, “those who 
apply for asylum in the West are routinely assumed to be 
illegitimate.”91 States lean heavily on past “humanitarian” 
actions, such as previous rates of refugee acceptance, while 
employing a discourse that redefi nes asylum seekers and 
refugees as “economic migrants,” “queue jumpers,” “illegals,” 
“gate crashers,” and “undocumented.” Once renamed, forced 
migrants are subject to a variety of strategies that thwart 
their entry or criminalize them once they have entered. Th is 
security-oriented concept of humanitarianism does not 
hold out a great deal of optimism for the potential recogni-
tion and protection of environmental migrants.
All refugees and asylum seekers must count on a per-
ceived humanitarianism that transcends politics, sover-
eign interests and public sentiment. Instead, Nessel shows 
that forced migrants fi nd themselves “fl oating between a 
humanitarian-based international protection regime and a 
restrictionist immigration regime.”92
Environmental Migrants: Contemporary Discourse 
in Canada, Australia, and the EU
Th e historical development of refugee law and policy has 
evolved based on “geopolitical considerations” rather than 
humanitarian principles. According to Williams, the geo-
political nature of environmental migrant fl ows is now 
apparent to many developing countries and organizations 
such as the UNHCR, but has not yet been aff orded “political 
priority” by the developed states.93 An exploration of the 
evolving discourse of developed states is useful, since in the 
absence of moral and expert leadership from the UNHCR it 
is from these that Canada is likely to draw its lessons.
A search of the major Canadian media fi nds fewer than 
forty references to climate refugees or environmental 
migrants in the last three years.94 Th e major NGOs such 
as the Suzuki Foundation make only cursory references to 
climate change refugees. A search of Canada’s four political 
parties’ platforms or policy statements fi nds that only the 
Green Party makes a reference to environmental refugees. 
It states that it will “advocate for the inclusion of environ-
mental refugees as a refugee category in Canada and accept 
an appropriate share of the world’s environmental refugees 
into Canada.” 95
Environmental refugees are very far from Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper’s stated concerns. His Conservative gov-
ernment, however, is currently engaged in a discursive 
reframing of immigration and refugee policies and he has 
recently called Canada’s immigration system “broken,” 
 Environmental Migrants and Canada’s Refugee Policy 
97
thereby justifying the imposition of visa requirements on 
two additional refugee-generating countries.96 CIC reports 
that the number of asylum seekers accepted to Canada 
has plummeted by 56 per cent in the three years between 
2005 and 2008.97 During the same period the number of 
people allowed into Canada as temporary workers, a stra-
tegic, economic category, jumped from 90,000 to 192,000.98 
Canadians guard and maintain their enormous privilege. 
An opinion poll conducted in July 2009 found that 56 per 
cent of Canadians felt that the refugee determination sys-
tem should be changed to make it more diffi  cult for people 
to make “false claims.”99
In 2007, a new prime minister was elected in Australia. 
Th e government of Kevin Rudd100 acted to remove some 
of the previous government’s more contentious practices, 
but failed to signal that it might recognize environmental 
migrants. In August 2009, Australia announced a new 
policy to support Pacifi c islanders who continue to abandon 
their villages and farmland to rising waters; Australia would 
help with the internal relocation of refugees on the islands. 
Tuvalu is one of the Pacifi c islands off  the coast of Australia 
that may well be submerged by the sea in the next few dec-
ades. Many islanders have already migrated to New Zealand. 
While New Zealand has a Pacifi c Access Category (PAC) 
agreement with Tuvalu, critics argue that its emphasis on 
labour qualifi cations means it is more concerned with eco-
nomics than with environmental migrants.101 Hoadley102 
argues that Australia’s concerns about Pacifi c migrants 
using New Zealand as a stepping stone to Australia’s social 
security system led to the trans-Tasman compromise, which 
resulted in a near convergence of Australian and New 
Zealand immigration and refugee policies.
Th e debate as to the eventual status of environmental 
refugees in Australia remains. vigorous. In October 2009, 
the Australian Green Party called for a new visa category for 
climate change refugees, and Australian lawyers are promot-
ing a Convention for People Displaced by Climate Change.103 
Meanwhile, a government MP has warned Australians that 
if they don’t populate Australia’s underdeveloped north, they 
will “face invasion by Asian refugees driven south by cli-
mate change.”104 In June 2010 Prime Minister Julia Gillard 
assumed offi  ce, and by July the Australian press had declared 
a swing to the right on refugee policies.105
Th e states most immediately at threat from sea level rises 
caused by climate change are lobbying vigorously for action. 
Tuvalu’s President Tong wants other countries to train his 
people for the jobs that they will need when they migrate. 
His people don’t want to be treated as refugees—they will 
be ready to fi t in.106 Th e president of the Maldives warns 
that his people face the prospect of life in a “climate refugee 
camp.”107
Th e EU’s geographical relationship to the countries of 
Africa is similar to that of Australia’s to the Pacifi c Islands 
and Asia. It is an obvious destination. In the absence of 
policy from the UN, the EU will arguably have the great-
est infl uence on the international refugee regime as it 
attempts to form a position on environmental migrants. In 
2007, the Belgian government voted in favour of promot-
ing international recognition of environmental refugee 
status at the United Nations.108 While there is diff erential 
response among various member states, the formal EU bod-
ies are tackling the issue. In 2008, the European Parliament 
adopted a declaration to “organize legal protection for the 
victims of climate events.”109 And in 2009, the Council of 
Europe stated that “the protection of people compelled to 
move due to climate and environmental factors is of para-
mount importance.”110
In 2011 only Sweden and Finland have allowed for both 
temporary and permanent status to individual migrants 
already resident in their countries who are unable to return 
to their countries of origin because of environmental disas-
ter. Canada made temporary allowances for people already 
resident in Canada at the time of the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami and following the Haitian earthquake in 2010.111
Conclusion
In 2011, the question of what policy Canada might develop 
in response to environmental migrants is characterized 
by many unknowns. Th ese persist because no developed 
state or international agency has committed to formulat-
ing rights and protections for environmental refugees who 
live outside of their borders. Canada has not even begun to 
address the issue. Other unknowns have been absent from 
the discussion presented in this paper, such as the degree of 
infl uence the US may have on Canada once it determines its 
own policy on environmental migrants. In the absence of 
policy from any developed state I have attempted to show 
the policy paths Canada may choose from by studying its 
historical record, reviewing the current trajectory of the 
international refugee regime, and revealing the nature of 
the developed world’s humanitarian response.
Does the existence of national and international debate 
on environmental migrants signal that there is a poten-
tial for change in Canada? In 2011, the Canadian public is 
racially and ethnically diverse and, as the historical rec-
ord suggests, it will increasingly come to infl uence refugee 
policy. Globalization and transnationalism have created 
complex social, political, and economic international rela-
tionships. If the UNHCR is able to communicate a vision of a 
world in which the suff ering of environmental migrants can 
be redressed, Canada, Australia, and other developed states 
might be convinced to fund and participate in international 
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programs. If the EU and the UNHCR agree on a designa-
tion for environmental migrants that obliges EU member 
states to engage in proactive and protective measures on 
their behalf, Canada might fi nd pressure from political allies 
and trading partners, coupled with the concern of Canadian 
citizens about their former fellow nationals, diffi  cult to resist. 
Canada would be able to draw its policy lessons from those 
formulated by the EU and communicated and diff used by 
international agencies and organizations. However, given its 
relationship to the US (affi  rmed by the Safe Th ird Country 
agreement), Canada is likely to follow once the US deter-
mines its own domestic policy on environmental migrants.
Th ere now appears to be a high level of convergence in 
refugee policy between Australia, the EU, and, to a lesser 
extent, Canada. All have engaged in systematic eff orts to 
secure their state’s borders against asylum seekers and to 
contain refugee fl ows at their origin. Dauvergne argues that 
the various ways in which these jurisdictions circumvent 
refugee law shows that they continue to accept that they 
have an international obligation to refugee protection or 
they would have simply abandoned it altogether.112 Th ey are, 
however, complicit in a process that excludes an increasing 
number of bona fi de refugees.
Canada’s lack of commitment to Kyoto objectives, its 
absence from the debate on environmental refugees, its pri-
oritizing of neo-liberal economic goals, and its shared place 
in the hegemony of globalization and the new humanitar-
ianism would suggest that it will not change its refugee 
policy to recognize any special status for people whose 
forced migration and permanent displacement is directly 
linked to climate change. Given the foregoing contextual-
ization, Canada may choose to draw its policy lessons from 
Australia, the state whose overseas refugee selection process 
most closely mirrors its own. If so, policy will be revised 
to eff ectively eliminate the right of migrants to claim refu-
gee status in Canadian jurisdictions. Canada, however, 
would risk its international reputation—certainly among 
developing nations—for taking such a position and would 
no doubt be admonished by the UNHCR with whom it has 
had a successful relationship for decades.
By 2010, Canada’s current Conservative government had 
managed a 56 per cent drop in asylum acceptance rates and 
was in the process of a discursive reframing of Canada’s 
refugee regime. It has called the refugee determination sys-
tem broken and allowed a backlog of claims that will (per-
haps) eventually need to be addressed with emergency meas-
ures. No formal exclusionary policy has been announced. 
Harper’s government will be aware that Australia’s Hawke 
government collapsed in part because of extreme formal 
and informal113 measures it used against asylum seekers. 
Nevertheless, the Harper government capitalized on the 
arrival of 492 Tamil refugee claimants by boat to the West 
Coast in the summer of 2010 and introduced Bill C-49. Th e 
Canadian Council on Refugees warns that this proposed 
legislation, ostensibly aimed at people smugglers, would 
curtail refugees’ freedom of movement, extend detentions, 
and deny family reunifi cation.114
In the early months of 2011, it appears that the 
Conservative government is on a policy path closer to that 
of Australia. Th e negligible level of domestic public debate 
about environmental refugees and the increasingly secur-
ity-oriented internal and external immigration and refugee 
apparatus is not encouraging. Canada’s absence from the 
international debate on environmental refugees, its priori-
tizing of neo-liberal economic goals, and its shared place in 
the hegemony of globalization and the new humanitarian-
ism would suggest that it will not change its refugee policy 
to recognize any special status for people whose forced 
migration and permanent displacement is directly linked to 
climate change. Canada’s past refugee policy record shows 
that it rarely acts independently, but draws lessons from 
states with similar profi les and from international bodies, 
in particular the UNHCR.
Th e UNHCR has asked that states focus on international co-
operation and human rights as they consider environmental 
migrants, since “it may take some time to reach agreement 
on the appropriate way forward.”115 Th e Canadian public 
is perhaps unaware of the many ways in which its govern-
ment has evolved a regime of exclusion. Canada’s reputation 
rests on its past record. It has received international recog-
nition for its generous and progressive interpretation of the 
Convention to include gender persecution. Canada could 
yet choose to take a leading role, in hand with the UNHCR, 
on negotiations toward a new framework for environmental 
refugees.
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